by Nicholas Bruno, Beck Redden LLP

The principles of statutory interpretation are often ancient doctrines. The roots of these principles can be demonstrated by the fact that many of them are referred to by their name in a dead language: Latin.  

Despite their age, or maybe because they withstood the test of time, these principles are still highly important today. Their application is seriously debated, and they have enormous consequences for some of the most contentious issues of the day, as demonstrated in several recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions.  

Appellate lawyers are familiar with these doctrines because they are often key parts of the argument in interpreting new statutes. Some of these doctrines are quoted more than others.  

Oftentimes, it is helpful to be able to cite a recent, controlling decision supporting a particular statutory construction principle. Below is a collection of various statutory interpretation principles cited by the Houston courts of appeals in the last few years. These principles are presented in no particular order:

  • Start with the statutory text: “To determine whether the Act serves as an independent basis for recovering attorney and expert fees in an action arising from a construction defect, we begin with the Act’s text.” Mitchell v. D. R. Horton-Emerald, Ltd., 579 S.W.3d 135, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); see Tex. S. Univ. v. Kirksey Architects, Inc., 577 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“We presume that the legislature deliberately and purposefully selects words and phrases it enacts, as well as deliberately and purposefully omits words and phrases it does not enact.”). 
  • The ordinary meaning of a word is typically used: “When a statute contains a term that is undefined . . . the term is typically given its ordinary meaning.” Nguyen v. Watts, No. 01-18-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2786841, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 28, 2020, pet. filed); see Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). 
  • Courts can reference dictionaries: “Courts may consult standard dictionaries in determining the fair, objective meaning of undefined statutory terms.” Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). 
  • Grammar and common usage should be used: “We read the text of the statute in context, construing it according to the rules of grammar and common usage.” Williams v. State, 582 S.W.3d 692, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d). 
  • Look to context to determine a specific word’s meaning: “However, we will not give an undefined term a meaning that is out of harmony or inconsistent with other terms in the statute. If a different, more limited, or precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning.” In re Hall, 286 S.W.3d 925, 929 (Tex. 2009); see Nguyen v. Watts, No. 01-18-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2786841, at *10-11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 28, 2020, pet. filed) (the “the ordinary meaning assigned by the legal profession”); see also Morris v. Ponce, 584 S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (“The meaning must be in harmony and consistent with other statutory terms and if a different, more limited, or precise definition is apparent from the term’s use in the context of the statute, we apply that meaning . . . . If an undefined term has multiple common meanings, it is not necessarily ambiguous; rather, we will apply the definition most consistent with the context of the statutory scheme.”). 
  • Consider the statute as a whole: “We are required to consider both the specific statutory language at issue and the statute as a whole . . . . We endeavor to read the statute contextually, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence.” Gaskamp v. WSP USA, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 457, 470 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. filed). 
  • Legislature is presumed to act with knowledge of judicial decisions: “Once appellate courts construe a statute and the legislature re-enacts or codifies that statute without substantial change, we presume the legislature has adopted the judicial interpretation.” Morris v. Ponce, 584 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied); see Jiminez v. State, No. 01-18-00123-CR, 2019 WL 1442098, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 2, 2019, pet. ref’d) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis . . . . has its greatest force in matters of statutory interpretation because the Legislature can rectify a mistaken judicial interpretation, and if it does not do so, there is little reason for courts to reconsider a prior statutory construction.”). 
  • Presumption against surplusage: “We give effect to all the statute’s words and, if possible, do not treat any statutory language as mere surplusage. We presume there is a purpose for every word and clause used . . . .” Nguyen v. Watts, No. 01-18-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2786841, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 28, 2020, pet. filed). 
  • Broad Language means expansive application: “As the Supreme Court of Texas has observed, the TMLA’s broad language evidences legislative intent for the statute to have expansive application.” Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at Galveston v. Jackson, No. 14-18-00887-CV, 2020 WL 1480166 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Mar. 26, 2020, pet. denied). 
  • Exclusive remedy provisions should be express: “[W]hen the Legislature seeks to make a remedy exclusive, it does so expressly.” Harris County v. S.K. & Bros., Inc., No. 14-17-00984-CV, 2019 WL 5704244, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2019, pet. denied). 
  • Agency deference: “If there is vagueness, ambiguity, or room for policy determinations in a statute, we normally defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as the construction is reasonable and does not conflict with the statute’s language. But we defer only to the extent that the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, and no deference is due where an agency’s interpretation fails to follow the clear, unambiguous language of its own regulations.” G&A Outsourcing, Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 14-18-00627-CV, 2019 WL 3432226, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2019, no pet.). 
  • Consider the legislative purpose: “Our construction does no violence to the statutory edict that courts liberally construe the civil barratry statute to accomplish its purpose to protect those in need of legal services against unethical, unlawful solicitation.” Nguyen v. Watts, No. 01-18-00421-CV, 2020 WL 2786841, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 28, 2020, pet. filed) (but also noting that “[l]iberal construction does not authorize a court to disregard the statute’s plain language”); G&A Outsourcing, Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 14-18-00627-CV, 2019 WL 3432226, at *3–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2019, no pet.) (“Guided by the statutes’ plain language and their interplay, as well as the overall aims of TUCA, we reject Appellants’ interpretation . . . . Moreover, Appellants’ interpretation is not supported by the policies underlying TUCA.”). 
  • Consider the consequences from a particular interpretation: “We consider the entire act, its nature and object, and the consequences that would follow from each construction.” G&A Outsourcing, Inc. v. Tex. Workforce Comm’n, No. 14-18-00627-CV, 2019 WL 3432226, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 30, 2019, no pet.). 
  • Presumption that the Legislature intended a just result: “We further presume that the legislature intended a just and reasonable result.” Morris v. Ponce, 584 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). 
  • Harmonize with other relevant laws: “Further, we are to construe statutes so as to harmonize them with other relevant laws, if possible.” Harris County v. S.K. & Bros., Inc., No. 14-17-00984-CV, 2019 WL 5704244, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2019, pet. denied). 
  • When statutes are ambiguous or irreconcilable, the more specific statute controls: “We turn first to the statutory construction argument that a specific statute always controls over a more general one. Far from being a universal rule of statutory construction, this principle applies only when the statutes at issue are ambiguous or irreconcilable.” Harris County v. S.K. & Bros., Inc., No. 14-17-00984-CV, 2019 WL 5704244, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2019, pet. denied). 
  • Ambiguous language: “Whether statutory language is ambiguous is a matter of law for courts to decide. Statutory language is ambiguous only if the words yield more than one reasonable interpretation . . . . We only resort to extrinsic aids when a statute’s words are ambiguous.” Morris v. Ponce, 584 S.W.3d 922, 925–26 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied). 
  • Interpret laws without second-guessing Legislative policies: “Our task in construing statutes is to effectuate the Legislature’s expressed intent, not to second-guess the policy choices it made, or to weigh the effectiveness of their results.” Harris County v. S.K. & Bros., Inc., No. 14-17-00984-CV, 2019 WL 5704244, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 5, 2019, pet. denied).